There is a belief that the psychiatrist came and saved the mad from the prison. That a wave of benevolence came and began to think of madman as patients and not prisoners...
gets coded as an act of 'liberation'
however, this physciatric treatment of madness is an illusion.
The Retreat
the segregation of the mad into communities (outside cities?) parallels a community of quakers in the following ways:
1) the sight of evil (by evil i think he means the 'other' is the cause of suffering in the soul of madman. "horror, hate and disgust." Segregation
takes away this sight.
2) religion plays double role of "nature and of rule". it is both reason and spontaneity at the same time. depth of nature is embodied in everyday practice and in education and its is a constant principle of coercion.
Religion has the only strategies to safeguard reason under the "delirious excitement of insanity." religion is what cannot go mad. it is the invidncble part of reason.
in the asylum, religion plays same role as in prison. In prison religion and social mileui forced improsnment from without. it literally excluded people to a confined space because they broke the edicts of religion or the social mileiu. In the asylum or the retreat the madness is not just controlled like it is in the prison it invests in the patient. he is not just secluded form the non-mad... but religion places its moral resaoning element within the invidual. "where he will bein debate with himself and his surroundings: to constiute for him a milieu where, far from being protected, he will be kept in a perpetual anxiety, ceaselesly threatned by Law and Transgression."
religion had to be filtered. aslysm is rea religious domain witout relgion
it could not included the worship and political belief. because these produced alot of history and meloncholy... it had to be filtired to only include those parts of it that were of moral content... had to bring man to closer to moral truth... return people to their duties and obligations...etc... eclusive of its fantastic text, exclusively on the level of cirtue, labor, and social life.
Boundry/non-boundry of Bio-=power:
acting on the body to acting through it.
foucault uses words such as Fear, Violence, and Power to describe the boundry or non-boundry of Bio-Power. in the prison the boundry was clear between reason and non-reason. Fear and violence over the fury(madness) was on the surface... which means external to the body... it confined the body.
but in the asluy or the retreatthe fear, violence or power is of great depth. it passes between reason and nonreason likde a "mediation" therouth the common nature they still "share" and "by which it could link them together" and cure the mad. Power, and ferar, and violence was now "endowed with a power of disalienation" which permitred it to restore a primitive complicity between the madman and the man of reason fear no longer outside of prison gates but within the walls of the conscience.
The values of family and work, all the acknowledged virtures (power) now reign in the asylum... the aslyum isn't excluded it is directly invested byu moral commnity.
evidence:
upon entering the retreat the madman was deshackled and given freedom so long as he didn't break rules of morality and of the asylum. "he promised to retrain himself." when the madman as he always did acted up the doctors threatened to punish him in the old ways... he would calm down and after a few months of this would be able to return to societity cured.
interpretation:
fear is transmitted to the madmen directly as in the prison... its the same thing.. only that it is through speech and not instruments... there is no quesiton of lmiting a libery that rages byeond its bounds...the doctors will punish someone who oversteps bounds... its the same thing as prison... but"arking out and glorifying a region of simple responsiblity where any manifestation of mandess will be linked to punishment"
Concentration of this madness to a class of people?
the aslyum has to impose its power on tohose who are unfamiliar with it... and those whome insantiy is arleady present before it has made itself manifest...
birth of madman.
it is the birth of the madman...
no longer just punished mad mans guilt... but it organised that guilt... he became an object... vulnerable to doctor and his own intevention. he was to cure himself and be cured. THis a movement by which objectifying himself for the other... (Transmission of biopower?)
to the outsider power has to act as an awakening and a reminder" invoking a forgotton nature; in the second it aacts a as a social shift in order to snatch the indiviudal from his condition
talking about boundary of reason and power... mandess used to be a great confinement to poverty and unemployment... but now it became a social falure which was its cause, model and lmit: mandess rose from the lower depth of society... that which is outside it. p150
methods by which asylum cures,... or by which fear flows through individual... and not imposed on surface.
silence. ignoring... exchange used to be in form of chains... now exchange and dialogue are eliminated...
Recognition by mirror... come to see self as objectively mad.
Tuesday, January 30, 2007
Monday, January 29, 2007
Reading Foucault's notion of Repression!
An exerpt and an interpretation:
“One has to be completely taken in by this internal ruse of confession in order to attribute a fundamental role to censorship, to taboos regarding speaking and thinking; one has to have an inverted image of power in order to believe that all these voices which have spoken for so long in our civilization—repeating the formidable injunction to tell what one is and what one does, what one recollects and what one has forgotten, what one is thinking and what one thinks he is not thinking—are speaking to us of freedom” (Scientia Sexualis, p60)
This passage, written by Foucault, vehemently argues against using a notion of repression to conceptualize the dynamics of power. Foucault proceeds by defining his use of the terms confession, repression and power. Lastly, he posits that the belief in struggle against a power conceptualized as repression as another effect of real power.
Foucault makes use of the practice of confession to illustrate the distinction between repression-power and positive power.
In the first sentence Foucault explains his use of the term repression. Repression is defined here as a kind of power that restricts the will of its target. In other words, to be under this repression-power is to be in effect imprisoned. He uses the words “censorship” and “taboos” as examples of what he means. Repression-power seeks to restrict, constrain, and submit the thinking and acting of its targets. Clearly opposed to such a conceptualization of power, Foucault states that to believe in its efficacy is to be taken in by a “ruse.”
Foucault next provides us with his notion of how power really works. He uses the following sequence of words, “to tell what one is and what one does, what one recollects and what one has forgotten, what one is thinking and what one thinks he is not thinking.” Foucault reveals key aspects of his conceptualization of power in this phrase. The phrase “to tell what one is and what one does” is a reference to the subjectification effect of power. By this I mean to say the constitution of subjectivity or identities amongst individuals. Power does not hold back human identity or keep the real truer subjectivity from expressing itself (as repression-power would propose), but it creates identity and forms individuals into subjects. The phrases “what one recollects and what one has forgotten, what one is thinking and what one thinks he is not thinking” are references to the distributive nature of power. Instead of power conceptualized as containment, Foucault forwards that power be conceptualized as distributive. By distributive I mean to say that it forces identity into certain molds and not others. It creates a logic of identity formation. Although there is a sense of containment in a notion of distribution, in that by forcing identify into certain channels it is implicitly constrained. Nevertheless, Foucault wishes to emphasize the positive effects of a distributive power. It constrains through active formation of identities and subjectivities not through their imprisonment.
Having identified the references made to a false and better notion of power their placement in expert reveals something about their relationship. Foucault uses the term confession as an act that transmits the false notion of repression-power. The confession here is used as a symbol of religious repression (specifically on sexual repression). As it is a “ruse,” people are made to believe that through confession the institutions are forcing one to admit to transgressions. Popular belief interprets confession as a method of policing the identity or subject. If one is to confess his/her sins then they are made to conform to the prohibitions of repression. This, Foucault states is an inverted notion of confession as it relates to power.
Confession in Foucault instead takes on the task of distributing identities. By confessing one is forced to take a stand on their own subjectivity/identity, they are forced to name what is and what it is not, both to the listener and to themselves. Acts turn into identities. The confession by marking sinful and non-sinful acts distributes the identity/subject/soul into different channels. Foucault makes use of the practice of confession to illustrate the distinction between repression-power and positive power.
Foucault illustrates how a critique of repression-power, which takes it as an object, is a feature of distributive power. Repression-power is not real, it is not prior to distributive power. Its existence is only in false popular belief. I have extracted a portio of this following statement in order better understand its meaning. He states, “one has to have an inverted image of power in order to believe that all these voices which have spoken for so long in our civilization… are speaking to us of freedom.” Here Foucault critiques the critiques of repression. The voices that speak of freedom or emancipation from repression are in fact misguided. Adding the extract taked from this statement reveals the connection of belief and even critique of repression-power is connected to the effects of distributive power. He states, “one has to have an inverted image of power in order to believe that all these voices which have spoken for so long in our civilization—repeating the formidable injunction to tell what one is and what one does, what one recollects and what one has forgotten, what one is thinking and what one thinks he is not thinking—are speaking to us of freedom.” It is those voices that critique repression that also fall victim to enforcing a distributive power. Those voices are in fact “repeating the injunction” of distributing identities/subjects/souls.
In this short extract Foucault accomplish several important tasks. Without having to go into a long discussion of what he means by repression-power and distributive power he makes reference to them with quick phrasing. Further, he uses the act of confession as an analogy to show how repression power becomes confused for distributive power. Lastly, he shows that the belief in repression power is an effect of distributive power. The task is complete; Foucault illustrates the relationship between belief in repression power and the actual existence of distributive power.
“One has to be completely taken in by this internal ruse of confession in order to attribute a fundamental role to censorship, to taboos regarding speaking and thinking; one has to have an inverted image of power in order to believe that all these voices which have spoken for so long in our civilization—repeating the formidable injunction to tell what one is and what one does, what one recollects and what one has forgotten, what one is thinking and what one thinks he is not thinking—are speaking to us of freedom” (Scientia Sexualis, p60)
This passage, written by Foucault, vehemently argues against using a notion of repression to conceptualize the dynamics of power. Foucault proceeds by defining his use of the terms confession, repression and power. Lastly, he posits that the belief in struggle against a power conceptualized as repression as another effect of real power.
Foucault makes use of the practice of confession to illustrate the distinction between repression-power and positive power.
In the first sentence Foucault explains his use of the term repression. Repression is defined here as a kind of power that restricts the will of its target. In other words, to be under this repression-power is to be in effect imprisoned. He uses the words “censorship” and “taboos” as examples of what he means. Repression-power seeks to restrict, constrain, and submit the thinking and acting of its targets. Clearly opposed to such a conceptualization of power, Foucault states that to believe in its efficacy is to be taken in by a “ruse.”
Foucault next provides us with his notion of how power really works. He uses the following sequence of words, “to tell what one is and what one does, what one recollects and what one has forgotten, what one is thinking and what one thinks he is not thinking.” Foucault reveals key aspects of his conceptualization of power in this phrase. The phrase “to tell what one is and what one does” is a reference to the subjectification effect of power. By this I mean to say the constitution of subjectivity or identities amongst individuals. Power does not hold back human identity or keep the real truer subjectivity from expressing itself (as repression-power would propose), but it creates identity and forms individuals into subjects. The phrases “what one recollects and what one has forgotten, what one is thinking and what one thinks he is not thinking” are references to the distributive nature of power. Instead of power conceptualized as containment, Foucault forwards that power be conceptualized as distributive. By distributive I mean to say that it forces identity into certain molds and not others. It creates a logic of identity formation. Although there is a sense of containment in a notion of distribution, in that by forcing identify into certain channels it is implicitly constrained. Nevertheless, Foucault wishes to emphasize the positive effects of a distributive power. It constrains through active formation of identities and subjectivities not through their imprisonment.
Having identified the references made to a false and better notion of power their placement in expert reveals something about their relationship. Foucault uses the term confession as an act that transmits the false notion of repression-power. The confession here is used as a symbol of religious repression (specifically on sexual repression). As it is a “ruse,” people are made to believe that through confession the institutions are forcing one to admit to transgressions. Popular belief interprets confession as a method of policing the identity or subject. If one is to confess his/her sins then they are made to conform to the prohibitions of repression. This, Foucault states is an inverted notion of confession as it relates to power.
Confession in Foucault instead takes on the task of distributing identities. By confessing one is forced to take a stand on their own subjectivity/identity, they are forced to name what is and what it is not, both to the listener and to themselves. Acts turn into identities. The confession by marking sinful and non-sinful acts distributes the identity/subject/soul into different channels. Foucault makes use of the practice of confession to illustrate the distinction between repression-power and positive power.
Foucault illustrates how a critique of repression-power, which takes it as an object, is a feature of distributive power. Repression-power is not real, it is not prior to distributive power. Its existence is only in false popular belief. I have extracted a portio of this following statement in order better understand its meaning. He states, “one has to have an inverted image of power in order to believe that all these voices which have spoken for so long in our civilization… are speaking to us of freedom.” Here Foucault critiques the critiques of repression. The voices that speak of freedom or emancipation from repression are in fact misguided. Adding the extract taked from this statement reveals the connection of belief and even critique of repression-power is connected to the effects of distributive power. He states, “one has to have an inverted image of power in order to believe that all these voices which have spoken for so long in our civilization—repeating the formidable injunction to tell what one is and what one does, what one recollects and what one has forgotten, what one is thinking and what one thinks he is not thinking—are speaking to us of freedom.” It is those voices that critique repression that also fall victim to enforcing a distributive power. Those voices are in fact “repeating the injunction” of distributing identities/subjects/souls.
In this short extract Foucault accomplish several important tasks. Without having to go into a long discussion of what he means by repression-power and distributive power he makes reference to them with quick phrasing. Further, he uses the act of confession as an analogy to show how repression power becomes confused for distributive power. Lastly, he shows that the belief in repression power is an effect of distributive power. The task is complete; Foucault illustrates the relationship between belief in repression power and the actual existence of distributive power.
Formalising Bio-power? part 1
An attempt at formalising Foucault's notion of bio-power!
what is the effect of biopower in individuals?
bio-power invents and then distributes the "soul" of individuals.
I understand the word "soul" as refering to an individuals subjectivity. I use the word subjectivity in the sense that it makes referance to an individual's agency. Subjects act and objects are out there in the world. Foucaut teaches me that even subjectivities are invented and distributed by a power (bio-power) external to the individual.
Foucualt emphasizes that the soul has a real, tangible, and even material existence.
"[the soul] esists; it has a reality; it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those... one supervises, trains, and corrects." 177
Finally, the soul is a creation of a political investment in the body. This is the EFFECT of biopower: it creates and distributes subjective existences in individuals.
"A "soul" in habits him and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body. The souls i the effect and instrument of a political anatomy..." 177
This can be
what is the political technology of the body
it is diffuse
"this technology is diffuse, rearely formulated in continuous, systematic disourse; it is often made up of bits and pieces; it implements a disparate set of tools or methods.
Because it is diffuse it is cannot be assigned to any one actor who controls it or is controlled by it.
Biopower is not a relation analogous to property: one does not possess it. It is, rather, a strategy. It is constantly acted out.
what is the effect of biopower in individuals?
bio-power invents and then distributes the "soul" of individuals.
I understand the word "soul" as refering to an individuals subjectivity. I use the word subjectivity in the sense that it makes referance to an individual's agency. Subjects act and objects are out there in the world. Foucaut teaches me that even subjectivities are invented and distributed by a power (bio-power) external to the individual.
Foucualt emphasizes that the soul has a real, tangible, and even material existence.
"[the soul] esists; it has a reality; it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those... one supervises, trains, and corrects." 177
Finally, the soul is a creation of a political investment in the body. This is the EFFECT of biopower: it creates and distributes subjective existences in individuals.
"A "soul" in habits him and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body. The souls i the effect and instrument of a political anatomy..." 177
This can be
what is the political technology of the body
it is diffuse
"this technology is diffuse, rearely formulated in continuous, systematic disourse; it is often made up of bits and pieces; it implements a disparate set of tools or methods.
Because it is diffuse it is cannot be assigned to any one actor who controls it or is controlled by it.
Biopower is not a relation analogous to property: one does not possess it. It is, rather, a strategy. It is constantly acted out.
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